Under exogenous participation, Myerson (1981) shows that the optimal auction can be implemented with a generalized second-price auction where bids are distorted in a very general (nonlinear) way. Similarly, bid distortions play a crucial role in presence of incumbents.
The price paid by the winner corresponds to the lowest bid he would have to submit in order to be still declared the winner (with some positive probability). Note that the price paid by the winner can never be strictly above his bid. Compared to truthful bidding, bidding below its valuation involves only the loss of some protable opportunities. Compared to truthful bidding, bidding above its valuation changes the nal outcome only in the case where p is above his valuation, i.e.
in the events where the nal price would have been greater than his valuation. On the whole, we obtain that LEMMA 11 For any generalized second-price auction, truthful bidding is a (weakly) dominant strategy. 51 In case of multiple winning bids, we need also a tie-breaking rule to complete the description of a specic auction. Here, any rule would suit, e.g. the one consisting in picking the winner at random.
52 When there are atoms the tie-breaking rule may matter in terms of the nal assignment. Nevertheless, it does not matter in terms of nal payos in equilibrium since the pricing rule under truthful bidding guarantees that the bidders involved in a tie obtain pay their valuation (this is because min{b ∈ R+|A This further implies that in equilibrium, bidders should bid truthfully in generalized secondprice auctions (since we assume that bidders use undominated strategies).
Let M GSP A denote the set of generalized second-price auctions with A k (b) = b for any k ∈ K. With this change of perspective, we obtain on the whole that for any m ∈ M GSP A , the expected ex ante utility of an entrant from group k is given by u k (q, q
The problem is somehow the same as before from the perspective of entrants, up to the twist that the CDFs of the valuation of the incumbents are now possibly distorted. In particular, 
We have also
The fundamental property of the pivotal mechanism (11) translates now into
In words, entrants obtain the incremental surplus they generate where the surplus is dened according to the distorted valuations.
i denote the total expected (ex ante) distorted welfare.
Comment: For the virtual pivotal mechanism, namely when m = m v-piv β,X , then the terms
As in (40), we get for each k ∈ K that
Combined with (52), we get then that
Concerning incumbents, we have for any i ∈ S
is decreasing, then we obtain that
Thanks to the regularity assumption, the function x − m[A I i ](x) is decreasing for any i ∈ I in the virtual pivotal mechanism and we get thus (26).
As in (42), we get for each i ∈ I that ∂ N W (q, q I , m, X)
Combined with (26), we get then for the virtual pivotal mechanism that
The 
which implies then from (50) that
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is almost the same as the one of Proposition 2. The dierence is that due to the rents of the incumbents, a calculation à la Myerson (1981) comes on the top of it such that we have to deal with the virtual net total welfare instead of the net total welfare. 
and then by integration
for any x ≥ x i and any m ∈ M and then by integration over x and with an integration per
Summing those rents, we get the expression (15) for the rents of the seller's objective.
For each i ∈ I, note that the participation constraints at the auction stage reduce to
while the incentive compatibility constraints require that the function 53 We stress that the fact that the incumbents may receive additional information other than just their private valuation, e.g. about the variable z, does not change the argument.
a constraint that will not be binding next thanks to the`regularity' assumption which guarantees that the virtual pivotal mechanism belongs to M GSP A as shown previously. (28), we obtain that ( q( m), q I ( m)) ∈ M ( m; σ( m)). To check that this is an equilibrium, we are left with (3). On the one hand (19) and the sequel). On the other hand, we have N W
β,X , X) for any m ∈ M (see eq. (25) and the denition of J virt (m v-piv β,X , X)). On the whole, we obtain that m v-piv β,X ∈ Arg max m∈M u( q(m), q I (m), m, X; σ(m)) which guarantees that this is an equilibrium and thus completes the proof of the existence of an equilibrium where the seller proposes the virtual pivotal mechanism and which implements the virtual rst-best.
We next show that any equilibrium that implements the virtual rst-best (and thus a fortiori any equilibrium with q I (m v-piv β,X ) = q I under the PG-renement) is equivalent to such an equilibrium as derived above.
Consider a given equilibrium ( m, q, q I , σ) that implements the virtual rst best. We have thus
β,X , X) for any pair (N, S) that occurs with positive probability, or equivalently that the good is assigned with probability one to the agent with the highest virtual valuation. Besides, any assignment where the good is assigned to the agent with the highest valuation can be implemented with the virtual pivotal mechanism provided that the breaking rule is well-specied (remember that we do not exclude that ties occur with a positive probability). On the whole we have shown that the equilibrium ( m, q, q I , σ) is equivalent to an equilibrium where the seller proposes the virtual pivotal mechanism and with the entry rates ( q( m), q I ( m)) ∈ J virt (m v-piv β,X , X) (an equilibrium which exists thanks to the rst part of our proof ).
Extension of Proposition 5.2 to multi-object auctions
The analysis without incumbents in Section II and IV extends in a straightforward way with multiple heterogenous objects when buyers' valuations and the seller's reservation values are both additive across objects, a model where the pivotal mechanism corresponds to using the ecient second-price auction for each objects. The key element in the argument still consists in showing that the net total welfare function is concave as a function of the vector of entry in the Poisson model. The net rst part of the total welfare (i.e. the one which comes only from the assignment of the goods) can be viewed as a sum of the expressions where each object would have been treated separately. In particular, the only thing that matters are the marginal distributions for each object.
As a sum of concave functions, this rst term remains concave with multiple objects. The second part of the total welfare (i.e. the one capturing the entry costs) is linear with respect to µ which concludes the argument for concavity.
Remark: At rst glance, such a setup seems to resume to a sum of various setups with a single good for sale. This is not completely the case since we allow implicitly some economies of scale through the entry costs. However those terms in the net total welfare function are linear in the vector of entry which does not alter the concavity property.
The analysis extends also to multi-unit auctions when buyers have unit-demand and the seller has at reservation values. The key element in the argument still consists in showing that the net total welfare function is concave as a function of the vector of entry as it is established below.
Formally, consider that the seller has L identical units of a good and assume that her reservation value for each unit equals X. The generalization of the standard second-price auction with the reserve price r is the L + 1 th -price auction with the reserve price r. When r = X, this corresponds precisely to the pivotal mechanism, i.e. the mechanism that match bidders' rents with their contribution to the welfare. To alleviate the notation, we show this point without incumbents and when entrants' valuations are drawn independently. But the result generalizes in a straightforward way to a setup with incumbents and with conditionally independent valuations.
A buyer with valuation u ≥ r who participates in the L+1 th -price auction with the reserve price r against the prole N when the reserve price is r will receive the expected payo of u r F (L:N ) (x)dx. Sticking to our previous notation, the expected payo of a group k buyer from entering such an auction (i.e. before knowing the realization of his valuation) is thus given by
which is a generalization of (34). We have then
We obtain then a kind of generalized version of (46)
where H µ X is the Hessian matrix of the net total welfare function at µ in the pivotal mechanism and where Q(
With respect to this setup, the allocation problem in the sponsored search auction setup (that has been presented in Section IV ) can be decomposed as assigning rst L homogenous units of size s L where each bidder can receive at most one unit, second L − 1 homogenous units of size s L−1 − s L , and so on the last stage being a single unit of size s 1 − s 2 . Sticking to our previous notation, we let V k,N +k (X) denote the expected payo of a group k buyer from entering the pivotal mechanism associated to the reservation value X per unit of good for the seller and facing the prole N of entrants. The generalization of (34) is now
We see thus that the problem shrinks to a linear combination of the previous one. The generalized version of (68) is then
with Q(x) := [(1 − F 1 (x)), . . . , (1 − F K (x))] and with the convention F (0:N ) (x) = 0.
The Poisson model and its foundation
To dene the equilibrium formally in the Poisson model, we have to slightly adapt our notation.
We let
• µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ K ) ∈ [0, ∞) K denote the prole of entry rates of potential entrants, namely when the Poisson distribution of group k buyer has mean µ k for any k ∈ K.
•
denote the probability of both the realization N ∈ N K for the set of entrants and the realization N ∈ K k=1 [0, N k ] for the set of opponents of a given entrant from group k, when the prole of entry probabilities for potential entrants is µ.
Then all the expressions of the expected ex ante utilities of the various agents extend by replacing q and P (N |q) with µ and P (N |µ) respectively. We have e.g. that u(µ, q I , m, X; σ(m)) = N ∈N K S⊆I P (N |µ) · P (S|q I ) · Λ N,S (m, X; σ(m)) denote the expected (ex ante) utility of the seller with valuation X in the mechanism m when the prole of entry rates is µ for potential entrants and q I for incumbents and when buyers follow the bidding prole σ(m). 
2. (Utility maximization for group k buyers at the entry stage, for any k ∈ K) for any m ∈ M,
3. (Utility maximization for incumbent i at the entry stage, for any i ∈ I) for any m ∈ M,
4. (Equilibrium conditions at the bidding stage) in any mechanism m ∈ M, bidders are using undominated strategies. Furthermore, when the seller chooses the mechanism m, the bidding prole σ( m) forms a Bayes-Nash equilibrium given the entry prole ( µ( m), q I ( m)).
The notion of equivalence between two strategy proles become: DEFINITION 5 In the Poisson model, we say that two strategy proles (m,
and
are equivalent if the prole of entry rates/probabilities at the mechanism proposed by the seller are the same, namely µ(m) = µ( m) and q I (m) = q I ( m), and if for any prole of bidders (N, S) that occurs with positive probability, 54 then the good is assigned in the same way with probability one (which implies in particular that W N,S (m, X; σ(m)) = W N,S ( m, X; σ(m))). ). What remains to be shown in order to guarantee that it is an equilibrium is that M (m; σ(m)) = ∅ for any m ∈ M * . Furthermore, we will delineate the status of the equilibria in the Poisson model by showing that any limit (in a sense that will be made precise in the sequel) of a sequence of equilibria in the binomial model should implement the rst-best and thus be equivalent to an equilibrium in which the seller proposes the ecient second-price auction.
Comment: All our arguments for environments without incumbents (where the ecient second-price auction implements the rst-best) extend straightforwardly to environments with incumbents as in Section III and where the virtual pivotal mechanism implements the virtual rst-best. In particular, we would obtain that any limit of a sequence of equilibria implements the virtual rst-best.
A preliminary mathematical lemma Consider two sequences
LEMMA 13 If n · q n converges to µ < ∞ when n goes to innity, then
Proof Let µ = max n∈N n · q n < ∞ which is well dened since n · q n converges to µ < ∞.
For any z ∈ N with z ≤ n, we dene 
It is well-known from the properties of the factorial that
For any i < z * , we have lim n→∞ [1 − q n ] n−i = e −µ and then we can easily check that lim n→∞
and then 
goes to innity when l goes to innity. When l goes to innity, it is our way to formalize that the number of potential entrants goes large in each group. LEMMA 15 Consider that a given strategy σ * is played in equilibrium in the mechanism m for any N .
If for any
goes to µ k (m) ∈ R + ∪ {∞} when l goes to innity, then µ k (m) < ∞ for each k and µ(m) ∈ M (m; σ * ).
In words, any limit of equilibrium entry probabilities in the binomial model is an equilibrium prole in the Poisson model.
Proof of Lemma 15
Below, we use the following notation for each k ∈ K: N k j = N k for j ∈ K \ {j} and N k k = N k − 1. Consider a given k. We rst establish that µ k (m) < ∞. Suppose by contradiction that µ k (m) = ∞. Then there exists l * such that l ≥ l * implies that q k (m) [N [l] ] > 0 and then from (4), we obtain
55 This is a very strong assumption. However, in generalized second-price auctions, we have in mind that σ for any l ≥ l * . This is also equivalent to
. . .
, for any l ≥ l * . Since transfers and valuations are bounded we have then that the sum of the payos of any subset of agents is bounded by x + T for any realization of the set of entrants. We have thus in particular that n k · V k,N +k (m) ≤ x + T for any N . The left-hand term in (76) is the expectation over N of an expression that is uniformly bounded by x + T is also uniformly bounded by x + T while the right-hand term goes to innity, which leads to a contradiction. We have thus µ k (m) < ∞.
By repeated use of Lemma 13 for each of the K sums, we obtain then for each k ∈ K that the fact that the inequality
] > 0 and then from (4), we obtain then that the equality
for any l ≥ l * which further implies that
satises the equilibrium equation (72) Every subsequence has a subsequence such that and we obtain that there exist a subsequence whose total welfare has the limit max Note that we have shown that 
α · b if b ≥ r and A k (b) = 0 otherwise for any k ∈ K, and A I i (b) = α I · b if b ≥ r and A I i (b) = 0 otherwise for any i ∈ I, with both α ≥ 1 and α I ≥ 1. It is straightforward to check that both the allocation rule and the payment rule depend solely on the ratio r α = α α I ∈ (0, ∞) and so that any generalized second-price auction in M linear X is characterized solely by this ratio. We use next the notation r α ∈ (0, ∞) to denote a generic mechanism in M linear X . The mechanism r α = 1 corresponds to the ecient second-price auction.
We consider the Poisson model throughout this Section. We will also consider that the entry costs of the incumbents are null so that they enter with probability one for any m ∈ M linear X and that their rents are not fully internalized by the seller, i.e. A3. We also assume homogenous entrants (K = 1). Last we assume that if the ecient second-price auction is posted, then some potential entrants will enter with positive probability. To sum up, ASSUMPTION A 7 K = 1, C I i = 0 for each i ∈ I, and u(0, (1,
To alleviate notation, for any r α ∈ M linear X , we let then
To alleviate the proof, we also add this technical assumption:
ASSUMPTION A 8 The CDFs F (.|z) and F I i (.|z) do not depend on z and are continuously dierentiable on their (common) support [x, x] with X ∈ (x, x).
In the auction r α ∈ M linear X , the probability of an entrant [resp. the incumbent i ∈ I] with valuation x ≥ X to win the good when he faces n − 1 competing entrants [resp. n entrants] and when the set of incumbents that participate is I is equal to [F (x) 
Using standard results from auction theory, we obtain that the (interim) payo of an entrant [resp. the incumbent i] from participating in the auction r α when facing n − 1 competing entrants [resp. n entrants] and when the set of incumbents that participate is I is given by
The ex ante expected payo of an entrant [resp. the incumbent i] from participating in the auction r α with the participation rate µ is then given by
for any µ and r α which justies that we assumed above that incumbents participate to the auction with probability 1 (more generally any bidders with a valuation strictly above X has always a strictly positive expected prot because he may face no competitors with a valuation above r). . From (81), the equilibrium condition (72) has a unique solution when the posted mechanism is r α : the solution corresponds thus to µ(r α ) the equilibrium entry rate for potential entrants when the posted mechanism is r α .
LEMMA 16 We have d µ(rα) drα ≥ 0 for any point r α ∈ (0, ∞) such that µ(r α ) > 0. As a corollary, the function r α → µ(r α ) is nondecreasing. Favoring entrants with respect to incumbents has two impacts on the informational rents of the incumbents: on the one hand, raising the ratio r α reduces their informational rents ceteris paribus (eq. (80)); on the other hand, raising r α increases the incentives of the potential entrants to enter the auction which is detrimental indirectly to the incumbents because they face more competition from new entrants (eq. (82)). On the whole, it is thus not ambiguous that increasing r α is detrimental to the incumbents.
LEMMA 17 For each incumbent i ∈ I, we have du I i ( µ(rα),rα) drα ≤ 0 and the inequality is strict if r α = 1.
Proof We note rst that du I i ( µ(rα),rα) drα
We conclude by noting that 1 ∈ ( X x , x X ). Q.E.D.
Next proposition formalizes that incumbents should be discriminated against entrants.
PROPOSITION 18 Assume A3, A7, A8, and M = M linear X . In equilibrium, the chosen mechanism r α satises r α > 1.
Proof of Proposition 18
In equilibrium, the revenue of the seller is given by u( µ(r α ), r α ) = Furthermore, the term in the bracket corresponds to the total net welfare which is maximized at r α = 1. Combined with Lemma 17, we conclude that Arg max rα∈(0,∞) u( µ(r α ), r α ) ⊆ (1, ∞).
Q.E.D.
